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Note
Use of Multicorporate
F Reorganizations To Carry Back
Net Operating Losses
Rev. Rul. 75-561, 1975-2 Cum. BULL. 129.
I. INTRODUCTION
A corporate reorganization involving the transfer of the assets
of one or more corporations to another corporation often raises
questions regarding the ability of the transferee corporation to
carry back postacquisition net operating losses under Internal
Revenue Code section 1721 to the preacquisition taxable years of
the transferor corporations. Suppose for example, that A, B, and
C Corporations transfer all of their assets to newly formed ABC
Corporation on January 1, 1977. For the taxable year ending on
December 31, 1977, ABC Corporation sustains a net operating loss.
The question is to what extent, if any, the 1977 loss of ABC Cor-
poration may be carried to the preacquisition taxable years of
A, B, and C Corporations to offset income.
Section 381 (b) (3) of the Code 2 generally disallows the carry-
back by a transferee corporation of a postacquisition net operating
loss to the preacquisition years of the transferor corporations.
Section 381 (b), however, makes an exception to this restriction for
acquisitions in connection with an F reorganization. 3 Thus, if the
above described transaction constitutes an F reorganization, at
least part of ABC's net operating loss may qualify for carryback
to the preacquisition years of A, B, and C.
The question is thus one of determining whether the contem-
plated transaction qualifies as an F reorganization. The Internal
Revenue Code's definition of an F reorganization is ambiguous.
An F reorganization is defined as "a mere change in identity,
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 172 (a) [hereinafter cited as CODE]: "There
shall be allowed as a deduction for the taxable year an amount equal
to the aggregate of (1) the net operating loss carryovers to such year,
plus (2) the net operating loss carrybacks to such year."
2. CODE § 381(b) (3).
3. See CODE § 368 (a) (1) (F).
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form, or place of organization, however effected."'4 Although the
meaning of "a mere change in identity" and "place of organization"
may be obvious, the meaning of "a mere change in form" certainly
is not. Furthermore, the regulations provide no explanation or
interpretation of the scope of section 368 (a) (1) (F).
For many years the Internal Revenue Service maintained that
the F reorganization provisions should be narrowly construed to
apply only to changes in identity, form, or place of operation of
one corporation only.5 Thus, in the Service's view, a merger of
three corporations into a new corporation, as in the above example,
would not constitute an F reorganization and so would not qualify
for the exception from the section 381 (b) (3) prohibition against
carrying postacquisition losses of the transferee corporation back
to preacquisition taxable years of the transferor corporations.
Under the Service's restrictive view of the F reorganization, it
would not be a viable tool with which practitioners could avoid
the prohibition of section 381 (b) (3) in corporate reorganizations.
At least one commentator has so stated,6 and in 1954 the House of
Representatives proposed the repeal of the F reorganization pro-
visions.7 The F reorganization provisions were not repealed, and
developments of recent years now seem to lend them increased
importance. After losing in a series of litigated cases, the Service
recently changed its position and conceded in Revenue Ruling
75-5618 that an F reorganization may, under some circumstances,
include more than one corporation. Thus, transactions such as the
one contemplated in the above example will be recognized by the
Service as F reorganizations if they meet the criteria of Revenue
Ruling 75-561.
This note more fully examines the provisions and significance
of Revenue Ruling 75-561. The discussion will be divided into
three parts: (1) a brief historical overview of the case law that
gave rise to Revenue Ruling 75-561; (2) an examination of the
provisions of the ruling; and (3) an examination of some of the
questions and problems the ruling leaves unanswered.
4. Id.
5. The Service's early position is summarized in Rev. Rul. 69-185, 1969-1
Cum. BULL. 108.
6. See R. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 82 (3d ser. 1940).
7. Only a protest by the Senate kept the F reorganization provisions in
the Code. See Hearings on H.R. 8300 Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 403, 539-40 (1954).
8. Rev. Rul. 75-561, 1975-2 Cum. 'BULL. 129.
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II. PRIOR CASE LAW RELATING TO MULTICORPORATE
F REORGANIZATIONS
The Service's concession in Revenue Ruling 75-561 that an F
reorganization may involve multiple corporations developed from
litigation wherein the Service tried to use the F reorganization
provisions as a tool to combat liquidation-reincorporation schemes.9
One of the earlier attempts by the Service to use the F reorganiza-
tion provisions in this manner was in Pridemark, Inc.1° In 1958,
two corporations under common control sold most of their assets
to another corporation, and then dissolved. In 1959 the sharehold-
ers of the dissolved corporations transferred those assets received
in liquidation to a newly formed corporation which conducted the
same business as had the two liquidated corporations. The Service
contended that there had been no liquidation, but rather a C or
an F reorganization of the two corporations so that any proceeds
retained by the shareholders would be taxable as a dividend rather
than as a capital gain. The Tax Court agreed with the Service
and held that the transaction did constitute an F reorganization,
rather than the liquidation of two corporations and incorporation
of a third." On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, the Tax Court decision was reversed on the grounds that
a complete liquidation had taken place.' 2 The court of appeals did
not, however, rule that an F reorganization could never encom-
pass more than one operating corporation.
The Service's big victory in using the F reorganization to attack
liquidation-reincorporation schemes came in Davant v. Commis-
9. Liquidation followed by reincorporation was an attempt by share-
holders to draw earnings out of the corporation at the more favorable
capital gains rates, rather than at the ordinary income rates at which
a dividend distribution would be taxed. The corporation would
liquidate and distribute its assets to the shareholders. The share-
holders would report capital gains to the extent that the fair market
value of the assets received exceeded their basis in their stock, and
would then transfer most of the assets received to a new corporation
in exchange for its stock. The result was that the shareholders could
withdraw earnings at capital gains rates, increase the basis in their
stock, and increase the corporation's basis in the assets. The Service
argued that this kind of transaction was merely a reorganization, not
a liquidation, and that any cash received by the shareholders
should be taxable as a dividend to the extent of the corporation's
earnings and profits, with the same basis being retained in the stock
and assets. See, e.g., James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964); David
T. Grubbs, 39 T.C. 42 (1962).
10. 42 T.C. 510 (1964), rev'd, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965).
11. 42 T.C. at 527.
12. 345 F.2d at 42.
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sioner.13 One corporation (Water) owned farm land, operated an
irrigation canal, and through various leasing arrangements, grew
rice on the land. The other corporation (Warehouse) dried,
cleaned and stored the rice grown on Water's land. Both corpo-
rations were owned in equal proportions by four families. The
shareholders wished to transfer Warehouse's assets to Water and
in the process draw some earnings out of Warehouse at capital
gain rates. To accomplish this, their attorney devised an intricate
plan whereby a third party borrowed money from a bank and
bought all of the Warehouse stock. Warehouse sold all of its assets
to Water for cash whereupon Warehouse liquidated and distrib-
uted its only asset, cash, to the third party. The third party used
the cash to repay the bank loan. The sales prices were established
so as to allow the third party a reasonable profit. The result the
taxpayers hoped to accomplish was to sell their Warehouse stock for
cash, thus giving rise to capital gain treatment of the proceeds
received, and also, transfer all of Warehouse's assets to Water.
The Service, however, took a different view of the transactions.
It argued before the Tax Court that the transactions in sub-
stance constituted a D or an F reorganization, and that any cash
received by the shareholders was taxable as a dividend to the
extent of the earnings and profits of both corporations. 1 4 The Tax
Court held that the transactions constituted a D reorganization,
and that the cash received by the shareholders was taxable as a
dividend, but only to the extent of the earnings and profits of
Warehouse. 15
In Pridemark and Davant the Service had been arguing that
multicorporate reorganizations could be F reorganizations appar-
ently without considering the favorable impact that F reorganiza-
tion treatment could have for the corporations involved with re-
gard to the carryback of net operating losses under section 381 (b).
After the Tax Court decision in Davant, the Service realized the
double-edged nature of the sword it was wielding, and when the
taxpayer appealed the Davant decision, the Service argued only
that the transaction was a D reorganization. The F reorganization
argument was conspicuous by its absence.' 6
13. 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), rev'g 43 T.C. 540 (1965), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1022 (1967).
14. 43 T.C. at 566.
15. Id. at 572.
16. See Rev. Rul. 69-185, 1969-1 Cum. BuLL. 108. Similarly, when the
taxpayer petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari,
the Service, in opposition to the petition, argued that the transaction
in question was a D reorganization.
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On appeal, the court found that the transaction was both a D
and an F reorganization, in spite of the fact that the Service had
argued only that it was a D reorganization. The court said: "At
least where there is a complete identity of shareholders and their
proprietary interests, as here, we hold that the type of transaction
involved is a type (F) reorganization."' 7
The first successful tax benefit use of the multicorporate F
reorganization by a taxpayer came shortly after Davant in Estate
of Stauffer v. Commissioner.'8 Bernard Stauffer was the sole
shareholder of three corporations, referred to as Stauffer Califor-
nia, Stauffer Illinois, and Stauffer New York. All three corpora-
tions were engaged in the business of selling mechanical weight
and posture control devices. In 1959, Mr. Stauffer incorporated
Stauffer New Mexico and merged the three existing companies
into it. None of the actual operations or assets of the three cor-
porations was ever transferred to New Mexico. All operations
continued as before the merger. Prior to the merger, Stauffer had
obtained a ruling from the Service that the transaction would con-
stitute a statutory merger under section 368 (a) (1) (A). After the
merger, Stauffer took the position that an F reorganization had
taken place, and accordingly, final income tax returns for the three
transferor corporations were not filed. Instead all operations were
accounted for in the return filed by Stauffer New Mexico. 19 In a
later year, Stauffer New Mexico suffered a net operating loss
which it sought to carry back to the preacquisition years of Stauf-
fer California, Illinois, and New York. A refund was granted, but
the Service later proposed a deficiency on the ground that carry-
back was not allowed because the transaction was not an F reor-
ganization. The Service's position was upheld by the Tax Court,20
but reversed by the ninth circuit.
The ninth circuit paid little attention to the Service's arguments
based on legislative history, or the fact that such an interpretation
of the F reorganization provisions was inconsistent with other sec-
tions of the Code. The main premise of the holding seemed to be
that if the taxpayer had effected the reorganization by merging
Stauffer New York and Illinois into Stauffer California, section
381 (c) would have allowed the California corporation to carry
back its postmerger losses to its premerger taxable years. The
court felt that merely because the taxpayer had chosen a new
17. 366 F.2d at 884.
18. 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968), rev'g 48 T.C. 277 (1967).
19. This procedure accorded with Rev. Rul. 57-276, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 126.
See text accompanying note 66 infra.
20. 48 T.C. at 304.
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corporate entity, it should not be denied the carryback that would
have been available under another form of transaction.2 1 Accord-
ingly, the court held that the transaction was an F reorganization
and that Stauffer New Mexico could carry its losses attributable
to the operations of each of the three transferor corporations back
to the premerger taxable years of those corporations. That is, the
losses of Stauffer New Mexico due to operations formerly con-
ducted by Stauffer California could be carried back to the pre-
merger taxable years of Stauffer California, and likewise with the
other two transferor corporations.
Associated Machine v. Commissioner,22 which was decided at
the same time as Stauffer, had slighty different facts. Two wholly-
owned corporations were merged into a third wholly-owned cor-
poration. The transferee corporation subsequently sustained a
net operating loss which it sought to carry back to the premerger
years of the transferor corporation by virtue of the fact that the
transaction was an F reorganization. The Service contended that
the transaction was an A reorganization and that carryback was
prohibited by section 381 (b). The Tax Court sustained the Serv-
ice's position,28 but again the ninth circuit reversed, holding that
the transaction qualified as an F reorganization. The court again
rejected all of the Service's arguments and held that an F reor-
ganization can include more than one corporation if the proprie-
tary interest in the transferor and transferee is identical, and the
business is not interrupted.
2 4
Even after the two defeats in Stauffer and Associated Machine,
the Service was far from ready to concede the struggle and issued
Revenue Ruling 69-18525 specifically rejecting the ninth circuit's
decisions in Stauffer and Associated Machine and the fifth circuit's
decision in Davant. The Service reiterated its view that the legis-
lative history and general statutory scheme of the Code mandate
against an F reorganization involving an amalgamation of two or
more operating corporations.
The courts did not find Revenue Ruling 69-185 any more per-
suasive than they had found the Service's arguments in the earlier
cases. Home Construction Corp. of America v. United States,26
decided after Revenue Ruling 69-185, represented possibly the
broadest interpretation of section 368 (a) (1) (F) to that date. In
21. 403 F.2d at 619.
22. 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968), rev'g 48 T.C. 318 (1967).
23. 48 T.C. at 326.
24. 403 F.2d at 624.
25. 1969-1 Cum. Bu-.L. 108.
26. 439 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g 311 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Ala. 1969).
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Home Construction Corp., 123 separate corporations under common
ownership merged into a new corporation. There was no change
in the business or in the proprietary interests in the corporations.
When the transferee corporation sustained a net operating loss it
attempted to carry it back to the premerger taxable years of 83 of
the transferor corporations. The application for refund was denied
and suit was brought in United States district court.' The court
upheld the taxpayers' position that the transaction was an F reor-
ganization and that the transferee corporation was entitled to
carry back its net operating loss. 2 7 The fifth circuit affirmed the
finding of an F reorganization and remanded the case to the dis-
trict court for a factual determination of to which transferor cor-
porations the net operating loss was attributable, holding that the
losses traceable to the operations of a given transferor corporation
could be carried back to the premerger taxable years of that cor-
poration to offset its income in those years. 28
Part of the basis for the fifth circuit's finding of an F reorgan-
ization was its reliance on precedent established previously by
another fifth circuit panel in Davant.29 However, the court also
found the Service's arguments unpersuasive and concluded that
Davant had established that a multicorporate amalgamation could
qualify as an F reorganization if: (1) an identity of shareholders
and their proprietary interests was maintained, and (2) the essen-
tial business enterprise was continued unimpaired, in a form that
was the alter-ego of the old.80
At this point it should be noted that all of the cases thus far
had involved a merger of corporations under the common owner-
ship of the same individuals. Thus, all of the amalgamations had
involved so-called brother-sister corporations. To this point, none
of the cases had involved parent-subsidiary mergers.
The first case to arise involving a merger of a subsidiary cor-
poration into its parent provided the Service with a new argument
against allowing the net operating loss carryback. In Performance
Systems, Inc. v. United States,8 1 a subsidiary corporation was
merged into its parent. Subsequently, the parent attempted to
carry back its postmerger losses to the premerger years of the
subsidiary. The Service argued that even if this transaction was
27. 311 F. Supp. at 839.
28. 439 F.2d at 1172.
29. The fifth circuit's panel precedent rule is explained in Home Constr.
Corp. of America v. United States, 439 F.2d 1165, 1169 n.5 (5th Cir.
1971).
3D. 439 F.2d at 1172.
31. 382 F. Supp. 525 (M.D. Tenn. 1973), affd, 501 F.2d 1338 (6th Cir.
1974).
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an F reorganization, it was also a section 332 liquidation. Section
381 (b) does not exempt a section 332 liquidation from its prohi-
bition against carryback of postacquisition net operating losses to
preacquisition taxable years of the transferor corporations. The
Service also argued that section 332 should take precedence over
section 368(a) (1) (F), and that the carryback should not be allowed.
The court began its analysis by noting that the transaction
came within three statutory definitions: (1) a statutory merger
under section 368(a) (1) (A); (2) a mere change in identity, form,
or place of operation under section 368 (a) (1) (F); and (3) a sub-
sidiary liquidation under section 332. The court noted that the
fact that the transaction was both an A and an F reorganization
did not disqualify it from F reorganization treatment under sec-
tion 381.3 2  The court then turned its attention to the argument
that section 332 should predominate over section 368. The court
did not attempt to carefully analyze the language of the Code, but
merely concluded that there was no reason for any section of Sub-
chapter C to apply to the exclusion of any other section, unless
such intent was clearly indicated. The court saw no reason why
an F reorganization that happened to also qualify as a section 332
liquidation should be precluded from receiving the benefits of F
reorganization treatment under section 381. The court pointed out
that if the parent had merged into the subsidiary instead of the
subsidiary merging into the parent, the net effect would have been
the same,3 3 but the F reorganization provisions would clearly have
applied because the transaction would not have been a section 332
liquidation. The court felt that this kind of technicality should not
preclude favorable treatment under section 381 (b).
A similar situation was presented in Movielab, Inc. v. United
States.34 In 1967, a subsidiary corporation was merged into its
parent. In 1969, the parent incurred a net operating loss which it
sought to carry back to the 1966 taxable year of the subsidiary.
32. See Treas. Reg. § 1.381(b)-l(a) (2) (1960).
33. The net effect may not be the same if one corporation has a net
operating loss it seeks to carry over. In Rev. Rul. 76-36, 1976 INT.
REv. BULL. No. 5, at 5, the Service held that in the case of a parent
into subsidiary merger, § 382(b) (3) does not operate to limit the
effect of § 382(b) (2), which requires reduction of the net operating
loss carryover where the stockholders of the loss corporation own less
than 20% of the fair market value of the outstanding stock of the
acquiring corporation. The limitation would not apply to subsidiary
into parent liquidations defined by § 332 because § 382 (b) applies only
to transactions described in § 381(a) (2). A § 332 liquidation is
described only in § 381 (a) (1).
34. 494 F.2d 693 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
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Again, the Service argued that since the transaction was within
the scope of section 332, that section should take precedence over
the reorganization section, and the net operating loss carryback
should not be allowed.
The Service propounded an additional argument in Movielab
as well. The substance of this argument was that the taxpayer
can gain access to section 381 (b) (and the corresponding favorable
treatment of F reorganizations) only through section 381 (a). To
come within the scope of section 381 (a) the transaction must either
be (1) one to which sections 332 and 334 (b) (1) 35 apply; or (2) an
A, C, D, or F reorganization to which section 361 applies.3 6 Clearly
section 361 did not apply to this transaction because the subsidiary
had received no stock of the parent corporation.37 Thus, the
Service contended, the taxpayer's only access to section 381 (b)
was through section 381 (a) (1), dealing with section 332 liquida-
tions. Since section 381 (b) does not except section 332 liquida-
tions, section 381 (b) (3) would operate to ban the carryback of the
net operating loss.
The court agreed that this complicated argument may be par-
tially correct, at least as to the Service's contention that section
361 did not apply to this transaction. The court rejected the
Service's suggested result, however, by holding that section 381 (b)
was broader than section 381 (a), and access to section 381 (b) was
not limited to the provisions of section 381 (a). Under the provi-
sions of section 381 (b), any F reorganization was eligible for net
operating loss carryback, not just F reorganizations to which sec-
tion 361 applied. The court found that the previously established
criteria of continuity of shareholder identity and proprietary inter-
est and uninterrupted business enterprise were present. Thus
there was an F reorganization, and net operating loss carryback
was allowed.
In Eastern Color Printing Co.,3 8 the Service made the same
argument, and the Tax Court rejected it for the same reasons the
Court of Claims used in Movielab. It should be noted that Eastern
Color Printing involved the merger of a subsidiary into a parent
that had been merely a holding company with its sole asset prior
to the merger being the subsidiary's stock. The Tax Court, how-
35. CODE § 381(a) (1).
36. CODE § 381(a) (2).
37. CODE § 361 (a). This section provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss
to a corporation that, pursuant to a plan of reorganization, exchanges
property solely for stock or securities in another corporation that is a
party to the reorganization.
38. 63 T.C. 27 (.1974).
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ever, steadfastly agreed with the Service that an F reorganization
could encompass only one operating company. Even though the
court rejected the Service's section 332 argument, it specifically
reaffirmed its position that the ninth circuit's decisions in Stauffer
and Associated Machine were wrong.89 Other cases have also
reached these same conclusions. 40
The purpose here is not to analyze the merits of the various
arguments made by the taxpayers and the Service or the bases
upon which the various courts have premised their decisions.
Such analysis of the substantive merits of the various positions has
been ably conducted elsewhere.41 The purpose in examining the
preceding case history was to establish a historical foundation for
the concession made by the Service in Revenue Ruling 75-561.42
The fifth,43 sixth,44 and ninth45 circuits, as well as the Court of
Claims 4 6 had held that an F reorganization could encompass an
amalgamation of more than one operating corporation if: (1)
shareholder identity and proprietary interest were maintained; and
(2) the business enterprise were uninterrupted. The sixth circuit 47
and Court of Claims48 had additionally held that a subsidiary into
parent liquidation that came within the provisions of section 332
could nonetheless still constitute an F reorganization for purposes
of section 381 (b). The Tax Court, although concurring with the
sixth circuit and the Court of Claims as to the subsidiary-parent
39. Id. at 34.
40. See, e.g., TFI Companies Inc. v. United States, No. 73-958-MML (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 13, 1974); Chapman Bldg. Co. v. United States, 34 Am. Fed.
Tax. R.2d 74-6193 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
41. See generally McManus, Judicial Law-Making: The Liquidation of
a Corporation Treated as an F Reorganization, 2 J. CoRP. TAX. 273
(1975); Pugh, The F Reorganization: Reveille for a Sleeping Giant?,
24 TAx L. REv. 437 (1969); Comment, F Reorganization and Proposed
Alternate Routes for Post-Reorganization Net Operating Loss Carry-
backs, 66 MIcH. L. Rav. 498 (1968).
The general conclusion is that the Service's position has the greater
merit. But McManus and the author of the Michigan Comment cited
above argue that policy considerations support the allowance of the
carryback.
42. 1975 Cum. BuLL. 129.
43. Home Constr. Corp. of America v. United States, 439 F.2d 1165 (5th
Cir. 1971); Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966).
44. See Performance Sys. Inc. v. United States, 501 F.2d 1338 (6th Cir.
1973).
45. See Associated Mach. v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968);
Estate of Stauffer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968).
46. See Movielab Inc. v. United States, 494 F.2d 693 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
47. See Performance Sys. Inc. v. United States, 501 F.2d 1338 (6th Cir.
1973).
48. See Movielab Inc. v. United States, 494 F.2d 693 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
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liquidation, steadfastly agreed with the Service that an F reorgan-
ization could involve only one operating corporation.4 9
With this background in mind, attention is now turned to the
provisions of Revenue Ruling 75-561.
IlI. REVENUE RULING 75-561
Rather than continue the litigation battle or appeal to Congress
for a legislative clarification of the F reorganization provisions,
the Service in Revenue Ruling 75-561 conceded that if certain
conditions are met, an amalgamation of more than one operating
corporation could qualify as an F reorganization and be eligible
for the net operating loss carryback under section 381 (b).
The ruling imposes three conditions for qualification as an F
reorganization. The first is that there must be complete identity
of shareholders and their proprietary interests in the transferor
corporations and acquiring corporations. The ruling specifically
covers the wholly-owned subsidiary into parent merger by stating
that the first requirement will be satisfied where the shareholders
and their proprietary interests in the parent do not change as a
result of the merger.
The second requirement is that the transferor corporations and
acquiring corporation be engaged in the same business activities or
integrated activities before the combination. If this language were
interpreted literally, it could prove to be somewhat troublesome.
A literal interpretation would seem to preclude the merger of
existing corporations into a newly incorporated shell. If the
merger takes place immediately upon the formation of the acquir-
ing corporation, there is no way that it can be engaged in the same
or integrated business activities as the transferor corporations
before the merger.50 Thus, the example posited in the beginning
of this note would not qualify as an F reorganization under the
ruling. The language of the requirement should not be read liter-
ally for at least two reasons. In the ruling itself, an example is
given to explain the net operating loss carryback requirements
imposed by the ruling in which three corporations merge into a
newly formed corporation. The example explains the extent to
which a net operating loss of the acquiring corporation can be
carried back to the premerger taxable years of the transferor cor-
porations. This is an implicit recognition that a newly formed
49. See Eastern Color Printing Co., 63 T.C. 27. (1974).
50. If the acquiring corporation is newly incorporated solely for the pur-
poses of the reorganization, it will not have assumed any business
activity prior to the merger.
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acquiring corporation does not have to be in the same or integrated
business as the transferor corporations before the merger.
Another reason that this requirement should not be read liter-
ally is that Revenue Ruling 75-561 is specifically premised upon
the cases previously discussed. Many of these cases involved
mergers of the operating corporations into newly incorporated
shells.5 ' Since the courts in the above discussed cases consistently
held such mergers to be F reorganizations, it seems only logical
that the ruling which acquiesces in those decisions would also
allow such mergers.
The third requirement of the ruling is that the business enter-
prise of the transferor corporations and the acquiring corporation
continue unchanged after the combination. The argument against
a literal reading of the second requirement also applies to this
requirement. Obviously a newly formed corporation must be
allowed to assume the business activities of the transferor corpo-
rations merged into it. It would be illogical to say that the ac-
quiring corporation must continue with no business activity.
If these three criteria are met, a transaction will qualify as an
F reorganization. However, to be eligible to carry back postac-
quisition net operating losses, two additional requirements must
be met. The first is that it be shown that the losses sought to be
carried back are attributable to a separate business unit or division
formerly operated by the transferor corporations. The second
requirement is that the transferor corporation have income in its
preacquisition taxable years against which such losses can be offset.
The carryback requirements are illustrated in the ruling by an
example. X, Y, and Z Corporations are all engaged in the same
business, and all of the stock of each corporation is owned by A,
an individual. On December 1, 1972, X, Y, and Z merge into the
new XYZ Corporation, with A exchanging all of his X, Y, and Z
stock for all of the stock of XYZ. For its taxable year 1973, XYZ
sustains a net operating loss of $70,000, of which $50,000 is attribut-
able to the former business of X and $20,000 is attributable to the
former business of Y. X had taxable income of $10,000 in 1972,
$15,000 in 1971, and $20,000 in 1970. Y had taxable income of
$10,000 in 1972, and net operating losses in all prior years. Z had
taxable income in all prior years.
XYZ is allowed to carry back $45,000 of the $70,000 net operat-
ing loss to the preacquisition years of X. Although $50,000 of
51. See Stauffer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 693 (Ct. C1. 1974); Home
Constr. Corp. of America v. United States, 439 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1971).
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XYZ's loss was attributable to the business of X and thus allow-
able under the first requirement, the second requirement further
limits the carryback to the amount of X's taxable income in the
allowable carryback years. X's total taxable income in the three
allowable carryback years was $45,000. Thus the carryback of
XYZ's loss attributable to X's operations is limited to this amount.
Although $20,000 of XYZ's loss was attributable to Y's business
operations, only $10,000 of this amount may be carried back.
Again the carryback is limited to Y's taxable income in the carry-
back years. No portion of XYZ's loss may be carried back to a
preacquisition taxable year of Z. Although Z had income in each
preacquisition year, the first requirement provides that the loss
carried back to a transferor corporation's preacquisition years
must be attributable to the business operations of that corporation.
No part of XYZ's loss was attributable to the operations of Z
Corporation.
Thus, the total allowable carryback is $55,000. The remaining
$15,000 net operating loss may only be carried forward.
IV. SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS
Although the provisions of Revenue Ruling 75-561 are seem-
ingly straightforward, they raise some questions which must be
answered before practitioners can rely on a transaction being
within the provisions of the ruling. Additionally, some of the
requirements imposed on loss carrybacks may be without legal
justification in the Code.
A. F Reorganization Requirements
The first F reorganization requirement is a complete identity
of shareholders and proprietary interests in the transferor corpo-
rations and acquiring corporations. The requirement actually has
two standards. First, there must be a complete identity of share-
holders. This would seem to mean that everyone who was a
shareholder of the transferor corporations must also be a share-
holder of the acquiring -corporation. This was true in all of the
litigated cases involving mergers of brother-sister corporations.
In fact, in all but Davant, there was only a single shareholder in
the transferor corporations and acquiring corporations.
In Revenue Ruling 66-284,52 the Service ruled that if less than
one per cent of the shareholders of the transferor corporations did
52. 1966-2 Cum. BULL. 115.
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not receive stock in the acquiring corporation the transaction
would still qualify as an F reorganization. Revenue Ruling 75-561
makes no mention of the application of Revenue Ruling 66-284.
However, in light of the fact that the requirement mandates com-
plete shareholder identity and the fact that all of the litigated
cases upon which Revenue Ruling 75-561 is based involved com-
plete identity, it would be unwise for a practitioner to rely on
such a de minimis exception as is set forth in Revenue Ruling
66-284 without first obtaining a ruling from the Service.
The second standard imposed by the complete identity require-
ment is potentially even more troublesome. Complete identity of
the shareholders' proprietary interests is required. The cases upon
which the ruling is based provide the most obvious examples. If
one individual owns all of the stock of each transferor corporation
and he owns all of the stock of the acquiring corporation, com-
plete identity of proprietary interest is maintained. Similarly, if
25 per cent of each transferor corporation is owned by the same
four persons and they each receive 25 per cent of the stock of the
acquiring corporation, complete identity of proprietary interest is
maintained. 53
Apparently no problem arises from a situation where the trans-
feror corporations are not owned in equal proportion by the share-
holders, so long as each shareholder owns the same percentage of
each corporation. 54 This can be illustrated by the following exam-
ple. Assume that the transferor corporations are X and Y. Each
has a net worth of $100,000. Individual A owns 60 per cent of the
stock of each corporation and individual B owns 40 per cent of the
stock of each corporation. X and Y then merge into the new cor-
poration, XY. A receives 60 per cent of XY's stock and B receives
40 per cent. Here, complete identity of proprietary interest has
been maintained. Before the merger, A theoretically owned
$60,000 of X's net worth and $60,000 of Y's net worth. After the
merger he owns $120,000 of XY's net worth. The same is true of B
($40,000 each of X and Y before the merger and $80,000 of XY
after the merger). Before the merger, A theoretically owned 60
per cent of X's assets and 60 per cent of Y's assets. He now owns
60 per cent of XY's assets which can be theorized to consist of 60
per cent of the assets formerly owned by X and 60 per cent of the
assets formerly owned by Y. The same can be said for B, as to his
40 per cent interest.
53. In Davant, four family groups each owned 25% of the stock. Within
the family groups, the number of individual owners varied from
family to family, but each individual owned the same percentage
interest of each corporation. 43 T.C. at 544.
54. This was the case in Davant. See id.
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Now alter the facts only slightly. Before the merger, assume
that A now owns 60 per cent of X and 40 per cent of Y. B owns 40
per cent of X and 60 per cent of Y. A and B each own net worth
of $100,000. After the merger A and B would each own 50 per cent
of the stock of XY. This would result in each still owning net
worth of $100,000 (50 per cent each of XY's net worth of $200,000).
However, the theoretical ownership of assets has changed. Before
the merger A theoretically owned 60 per cent of X's assets and 40
per cent of Y's assets. After the merger, A would theoretically
own 50 per cent of XY's assets but his 50 per cent would be com-
prised of 50 per cent of the assets formerly owned by X and 50 per
cent of the assets formerly owned by Y. Unless the definition of
proprietary interest is limited to a percentage ownership in the
net worth of the corporation, there has been a change of proprie-
tary interest in this instance.
This idea can be carried to its ultimate extension in the situa-
tion where A owns all of X and B owns all of Y. After the merger
each owns 50 per cent of XY, and each has maintained his same
net worth. However, the theoretical composition of the assets
each owns has altered radically.
This would seem to be beyond the scope of the F reorganiza-
tion provisions defined in Revenue Ruling 75-561. Once again, the
practitioner should confine himself to the fact situations of the
prior cases, unless he first obtains a ruling.
The second F reorganization requirement-that the transferor
and acquiring corporations be engaged in the same business activ-
ity before the merger-has been previously discussed. 55 What
would constitute the same or integrated business activities is diffi-
cult to forecast. This would seem to be a factual determination
which will have to be made in each individual case. Clearly, the
further one ventures from the obvious situations, the more risky
the transaction becomes.
The third requirement stipulates that the business enterprise
of the transferor and acquiring corporations must continue un-
changed after the combination. An examination of the prior case
law could be helpful in determining some of the factors which
may be involved in determining if the business enterprise has
changed. Obviously, in each of the cases, the court found that no
change had occurred and in most of the cases the court at least
mentioned the factors that led it to that conclusion.
55. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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In Davant, the court merely stated that "absolutely no disrup-
tion was occasioned by the paper transfer."56 In Stauffer, the
court found that the books of each premerger corporation were
maintained, and the enterprises operated in the same manner at
the same locations. 57 The Associated Machine court noted that
both corporations had the same officers and directors.5 8 The court
in Home Construction noted several factors, including no changes
in scope or type of overall business operations, and no change in
location, location of management headquarters, overall assets, per-
sonnel employed in the operations, or methods of operations. The
only changes were simplification of bookkeeping procedures. 59 In
Performance Systems, the court found no changes in the form or
location of corporate assets, personnel or management, type or
method of business operations, or officers and directors. 60 The
Movielab court noted that "[t]he same business was being con-
ducted without interruption-at the same location, by the same
management .... "I In Eastern Color Printing, there was no
change in assets, location, personnel, or management. With minor
exceptions, the directors and officers were unchanged.62
It can be seen that many of the same factors appear in several
cases. Although these considerations should not be viewed as
conclusive one way or the other, they do provide some general
guidelines. They serve to reiterate the point that an F reorgani-
zation is a mere change in form.6 3 A reorganization that contem-
plates substantial physical relocation of assets or personnel changes
would seem to be vulnerable to attack under this requirement.
B. Carryback Requirements
Possible ramifications of F reorganization treatment for multi-
corporate reorganizations have been discussed in other articles. 4
Our scope will be limited to those problems presented by the
56. 366 F.2d at 879.
57. 403 F.2d at 619.
58. 403 F.2d at 625.
59. 439 F.2d at 1167.
60. 382 F. Supp. at 532.
61. 494 F.2d at 699.
62. 63 T.C. at 28.
63. See CODE § 368(a) (1) (F).
64. McManus, supra note 41, discusses the possible application of the F
reorganization provisions to the liquidation of insolvent subsidiaries,
and to liquidations in which § 334 (b) (2) applies. In Vienna, Effect
of a Multi-Corporate F Reorganization on Loss Carryovers and Carry-
backs, 42 J. TAx. 130 (1975), the author discusses the possibility of
there being multiple transferees in an F reorganization.
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carryback of postacquisition net operating losses to preacquisition
years of the transferor corporations.
An initial problem is that of the termination of the taxable
years of the transferor corporations. Revenue Ruling 75-561
clearly requires that in order for an acquiring corporation to carry
back postacquisition losses to preacquisition taxable years of the
transferor corporations, the loss sought to be carried back must be
attributable to a separate business unit formerly operated by the
transferor corporation. However, section 381 (b) exempts an F
reorganization from the requirement of section 381 (b) (1) that the
taxable year of the transferor end on the date of the transfer.65
Revenue Ruling 57-27606 provides that when an F reorganization
occurs, the part of the acquiring corporation's taxable year before
the reorganization and after it constitute a single taxable year of
the acquiring corporation. Additionally, the transferor corpora-
tions do not file income tax returns for that year. Only the ac-
quiring corporation files a return and includes all of the opera-
tions of the combined group. Thus, at least for the year of the
merger, the requirements of Revenue Ruling 75-561 apparently
can be flouted.
Assume X and Y are both calendar year corporate taxpayers
wholly owned by A, an individual. X has income and Y has a
loss for taxable year 1976. If, on December 31, 1976, X merges into
Y, section 381 (b) (1) and Revenue Ruling 57-276 would allow Y to
file a single -return for the year, including both its operations and
X's. This would allow an offset of X's premerger taxable income
against Y's loss for the part of the taxable year before the merger,
in direct contravention of the policy of Revenue Ruling 75-561.
If, however, section 381 (b) required that X's taxable year ter-
minate on the date of the transfer, and that a separate return be
filed for the part year, such offset would not be possible because X's
income would then be locked in a preacquisition year and by the
terms of Revenue Ruling 75-561 Y could carry back losses to that
year only to the extent that such losses were attributable to X's
operations, which of course they would not be. The offset would
also not have been possible if the merger had occurred one day
later on January 1, 1977. In that case, each corporation would
have filed a separate return for the full taxable year 1976. Thus,
by executing the merger one day earlier, an immense tax advan-
tage could be obtained.
65. See CODE § 381(b) (1).
66. 1957-1 Cum. BuLL. 126.
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If the Service is to prevent the circumvention of the policy of
the ruling it appears that at least in the case of F reorganizations
involving two or more active corporations, the taxable year of the
transferor corporations will have to be terminated on the date of
the transfer. Terminating the tax years on the date of transfer
would also eliminate many problems that could arise if the cor-
porations have different fiscal years.
The requirement that the carryback of postacquisition losses
to preacquisition years be limited to that part of the loss that was
attributable to the business operations of the transferor corpora-
tion presents two additional questions. The first is whether this is
a proper limitation to impose. The requirement was imposed by
the prior case law. In Stauffer, the first case to allow net operating
loss carryback, the court seemed to rely on the well known pre-1954
Code case of Libson Shops, Inc. v. Kohler.67 The case dealt with
the allowability of loss carryovers. Sixteen separate corporations
were merged into another corporation. Three of the corporations
were loss corporations before the merger and continued to be
unprofitable after the merger. The taxpayer attempted to carry
over these premerger losses to offset postmerger income earned by
those parts of the new corporation that were profitable both before
and after merger. The Court said the losses should be permitted
to be carried over only to offset income attributable to the same
business operations after the merger. The underlying policy was
that the taxpayer should not gain a tax windfall as a result of the
merger. The Court reasoned that but for the merger, the losses
never could have crossed business lines, and that therefore, the
merger should not result in cross-over either.68 The same "but for"
reasoning is apparent in Stauffer regarding carrybacks. 69 Home
Construction clearly applies the Libson Shops criteria,7 0 and the
limitation was obviously retained by Revenue Ruling 75-561.
There is at least a legitimate question as to whether the Libson
Shops case should be applicable to the 1954 Code in any way.
Sections 381 and 382 regulate the carryover and carryback of net
operating losses after corporate reorganizations under the 1954
Code. These provisions had no counterparts in the 1939 Code,
under which Libson Shops was decided.
67. 353 U.S. 382 (1957). Although the case was decided under the rules
of the 1939 Code, it was actually decided after the adoption of the
1954 Code.
68. Id. at 388-90.
69. 403 F.2d at 621.
70. 439 F.2d at 1172.
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Courts have split on the question of whether Libson Shops has
any application under the 1954 Code.71 Even if the principle is
not applicable to carryovers, such fact would not automatically
preclude the application of the same principle to carrybacks. How-
ever, one commentator has suggested that to require that the loss
carrybacks not cross business lines is to deny that an F reorgani-
zation is a mere change of form.7 2  The suggestion is that if the
new entity is really the alter-ego of the old, there is no reason to
deny a cross-over of losses.73
Although taxpayers may have room to argue that the ruling's
carryback requirements have no statutory basis in the 1954 Code,
this appears to be a difficult argument since the ruling's require-
ments were firmly entrenched in the case law upon which the
ruling is based. Assuming the requirement is valid, we must now
examine the problems it may cause.
The principal problems appear to be of definition and account-
ing. The question is what burden the taxpayer must sustain to
show that a loss is attributable to a separate business unit or divi-
sion formerly operated by the transferor corporation. Revenue
Ruling 59-39574 issued after Libson Shops, held that the taxpayer
had the burden of proving the amount of deduction on credit
allowable to the portion of the business of the resulting corpora-
tion which was conducted with the assets of the merged corpora-
tion. This same burden will probably remain on the taxpayer
71. Compare United States v. Adkins-Phelps, Inc., 400 F.2d 737 (8th Cir.
1968); Frederick Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 375 F.2d 351 (6th Cir.
1967); Maxwell Hardware Co. v. Commissioner, 343 F.2d 713 (9th Cir.
1965); and WOFAC Corp. v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 654 (D.N.J.
1967), which hold that Libson Shops doctrine is not applicable to cases
arising under the 1954 Code, with Frank Ix & Sons Va. v. Commis-
sioner, 375 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1967); United States v. Jackson Olds-
mobile, Inc., 371 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1967); Huyler's v. Commissioner,
327 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1964); and J.G. Dudley Co. v. Commissioner,
298 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1961), which hold that Libson Shops retains its
value as precedent.
In TIR 773, 1 55,063 P-H 1965 FED. TAxEs, the Service stated that
it would not follow Maxwell Hardware and that the Libson Shops
doctrine continued to be valid under the 1954 Code. The Service also
said, however, that Libson Shops would not be applied to loss carry-
overs unless there had been a 50% or more shift in the benefits of the
loss carryover and a change in the business as defined in § 382 (a).
72. See McManus, supra note 41, at 291-92.
73. For a detailed discussion of the argument that Libson Shops should
have no application under the 1954 Code see Sinrich, Libson Shops-
An Argument Against Its Application Under the 1954 Code, 13 TAx L.
REv. 167 (1958).
74. 1959-2 Cum. BuLL. 475.
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under Revenue Ruling 75-561. The taxpayer should be allowed
to adopt a new accounting system as long as the operations of the
merged corporations may be separately identified to the Service's
satisfaction.
To the extent that any type of permissible centralization of
management or administration occurs after an F reorganization,
administrative overhead costs attributable to all corporations
would in some way have to be allocated to the various businesses
of the merged corporation for purposes of establishing the origin
of the losses.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Although the concessions made by the Service in Revenue
Ruling 75-561 have the potential of a new range of possibilities for
the reorganization planner, the ruling is clouded with enough
uncertainties to make it difficult to determine in advance whether
a transaction will qualify as an F reorganization and consequently
be eligible for net operating loss carryback.
One way to alleviate some of the problems would be for the
Service to adopt a policy -of ruling on proposed transactions with
regard to compliance with the requirements of Revenue Ruling
75-561. However, even with advance rulings there is a practical
problem of including enough facts in the ruling request so that
the Service will be ruling on the same transaction as the planner
contemplates executing. This could become especially difficult
with regard to all of the criteria courts have used to determine
if the business enterprise has continued unchanged. 75
A better solution may be for the Service to issue a new set of
regulations interpreting section 368 (a) (1) (F) as to the definition
of an F reorganization and section 381 relating to the allowability
of loss carrybacks. Even with rulings and interpretive regulations,
continued litigation in the F reorganization area can be expected
as taxpayers begin to take advantage of the provisions of Revenue
Ruling 75-561 and as counsel seek to determine how far the bounda-
ries can be stretched.
Thomas N. Lawson '77
75. See text accompanying notes 56-63 supra.
